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Abstract
Recent events, such as the 2016 US Presi-
dential Campaign, Brexit and the COVID-19
“infodemic”, have brought into the spotlight
the dangers of online disinformation. There
has been a lot of research focusing on fact-
checking and disinformation detection. How-
ever, little attention has been paid to the spe-
cific rhetorical and psychological techniques
used to convey propaganda messages. Reveal-
ing the use of such techniques can help pro-
mote media literacy and critical thinking, and
eventually contribute to limiting the impact of
“fake news” and disinformation campaigns.
Prta (Propaganda Persuasion Techniques An-
alyzer) allows users to explore the articles
crawled on a regular basis by highlighting the
spans in which propaganda techniques occur
and to compare them on the basis of their use
of propaganda techniques. The system further
reports statistics about the use of such tech-
niques, overall and over time, or according to
filtering criteria specified by the user based on
time interval, keywords, and/or political orien-
tation of the media. Moreover, it allows users
to analyze any text or URL through a dedicated
interface or via an API. The system is available
online: https://www.tanbih.org/prta.
1 Introduction
Brexit and the 2016 US Presidential cam-
paign (Muller, 2018), as well as major events such
the COVID-19 outbreak (World Health Organiza-
tion, 2020), were marked by disinformation cam-
paigns at an unprecedented scale. This has brought
the public attention to the problem, which became
known under the name “fake news”. Even though
declared word of the year 2017 by Collins dictio-
nary,1 we find that term unhelpful, as it can easily
mislead people, and even fact-checking organiza-
tions, to only focus on the veracity aspect.
1https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-41838386
At the EU level, a more precise term is preferred,
disinformation, which refers to information that is
both (i) false, and (ii) intents to harm. The often-
ignored aspect (ii) is the main reasons why disin-
formation has become an important issue, namely
because the news was weaponized.
Another aspect that has been largely ignored
is the mechanism through which disinformation
is being conveyed: using propaganda techniques.
Propaganda can be defined as (i) trying to influ-
ence somebody’s opinion, and (ii) doing so on pur-
pose (Da San Martino et al., 2020). Note that this
definition is orthogonal to that of disinformation:
Propagandist news can be both true and false, and
it can be both harmful and harmless (it could even
be good). Here our focus is on the propaganda
techniques: on their typology and use in the news.
Propaganda messages are conveyed via spe-
cific rhetorical and psychological techniques, rang-
ing from leveraging on emotions —such as using
loaded language (Weston, 2018, p. 6), flag wav-
ing (Hobbs and Mcgee, 2008), appeal to author-
ity (Goodwin, 2011), slogans (Dan, 2015), and
cliche´s (Hunter, 2015)— to using logical fallacies
—such as straw men (Walton, 1996) (misrepresent-
ing someone’s opinion), red herring (Weston, 2018,
p. 78),(Teninbaum, 2009) (presenting irrelevant
data), black-and-white fallacy (Torok, 2015) (pre-
senting two alternatives as the only possibilities),
and whataboutism (Richter, 2017).
Here, we present Prta —the PRopaganda per-
suasion Techniques Analyzer. Prta makes online
readers aware of propaganda by automatically de-
tecting the text fragments in which propaganda
techniques are being used as well as the type of
propaganda technique in use. We believe that re-
vealing the use of such techniques can help promote
media literacy and critical thinking, and eventually
contribute to limiting the impact of “fake news”
and disinformation campaigns.
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Technique • Snippet
loaded language • Outrage as Donald Trump suggests injecting disinfectant to kill virus.
name calling, labeling • WHO: Coronavirus emergency is ’Public Enemy Number 1’
repetition • I still have a dream. It is a dream deeply rooted in the American dream. I have a dream that one day . . .
exaggeration, minimization • Coronavirus ’risk to the American people remains very low’, Trump said.
doubt • Can the same be said for the Obama Administration?
appeal to fear/prejudice • A dark, impenetrable and irreversible winter of persecution of the faithful by their
own shepherds will fall.
flag-waving • Mueller attempts to stop the will of We the People!!! It’s time to jail Mueller.
causal oversimplification • If France had not have declared war on Germany then World War II would have
never happened.
slogans • “BUILD THE WALL!” Trump tweeted.
appeal to authority • Monsignor Jean-Franois Lantheaume, who served as first Counsellor of the Nunciature in
Washington, confirmed that “Vigan said the truth. That’s all.”
black-and-white fallacy • Francis said these words: Everyone is guilty for the good he could have done and did
not do . . . If we do not oppose evil, we tacitly feed it.
obfuscation, Intentional vagueness, Confusion • Women and men are physically and emotionally dif-
ferent. The sexes are not “equal,” then, and therefore the law should not pretend that we are!
thought-terminating cliches • I do not really see any problems there. Marx is the President.
whataboutism • President Trump —who himself avoided national military service in the 1960’s— keeps beating the war
drums over North Korea.
reductio ad hitlerum • “Vichy journalism,” a term which now fits so much of the mainstream media. It collaborates
in the same way that the Vichy government in France collaborated with the Nazis.
red herring • “You may claim that the death penalty is an ineffective deterrent against crime – but what about the
victims of crime? How do you think surviving family members feel when they see the man who murdered their son kept
in prison at their expense? Is it right that they should pay for their son’s murderer to be fed and housed?”
bandwagon • He tweeted, “EU no longer considers #Hamas a terrorist group. Time for US to do same.”
straw man • “Take it seriously, but with a large grain of salt.” Which is just Allen’s more nuanced way of saying: “Don’t
believe it.”
Table 1: Our 18 propaganda techniques with example snippets. The propagandist span appears highlighted.
With Prta, users can explore the contents of
articles about a number of topics, crawled from a
variety of sources and updated on a regular basis,
and to compare them on the basis of their use of
propaganda techniques. The application reports
overall statistics about the occurrence of such tech-
niques, as well as their usage over time, or accord-
ing to user-defined filtering criteria such as time
span, keywords, and/or political orientation of the
media. Furthermore, the application allows users
to input and to analyze any text or URL of interest;
this is also possible via an API, which allows other
applications to be built on top of the system.
Prta relies on a supervised multi-granularity
gated BERT-based model, which we train on a cor-
pus of news articles annotated at the fragment level
with 18 propaganda techniques, a total of 350K
word tokens (Da San Martino et al., 2019).
Our work is in contrast to previous efforts, where
propaganda has been tackled primarily at the article
level (Rashkin et al., 2017; Barro´n-Ceden˜o et al.,
2019; Barro´n-Ceden˜o et al., 2019). It is also differ-
ent from work in the related field of computational
argumentation, which deals with some specific log-
ical fallacies related to propaganda, such as ad
hominem fallacy (Habernal et al., 2018b).
Consider the game Argotario, which educates
people to recognize and create fallacies such as
ad hominem, red herring and irrelevant authority,
which directly relate to propaganda (Habernal et al.,
2017, 2018a). Unlike them, we have a richer inven-
tory of techniques and we show them in the context
of actual news.
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 introduces the machine learning
model at the core of the Prta system. Section 3
sketches the full architecture of Prta, with focus
on the process of collection and processing of the
input articles. Section 4 describes the system in-
terface and its functionality, and presents some ex-
amples. Section 5 draws conclusions and discusses
possible directions for future work.
2 Data and Model
Data We train our model on a corpus of 350K to-
kens (Da San Martino et al., 2019; Yu et al., 2019),
manually annotated by professional annotators with
the instances of use of eighteen propaganda tech-
niques. See Table 1 for a complete list and exam-
ples for each of these techniques.2
2Detailed list with definitions and examples is available at
http://propaganda.qcri.org/annotations/definitions.html
Figure 1: The architecture of our model.
Model Our model is based on multi-task learning
with the following two tasks:
FLC Fragment-level classification. Given a sen-
tence, identify all spans of use of propaganda
techniques in it and the type of technique.
SLC Sentence-level classification. Given a sen-
tence, predict whether it contains at least one
propaganda technique.
Our model adds on top of BERT (Devlin et al.,
2019) a set of layers that combine information from
the fragment- and the sentence-level annotations
to boost the performance of the FLC task on the
basis of the SLC task. The network architecture
is shown in Figure 1, and we refer to it as a multi-
granularity network. It features 19 output units for
each input token in the FLC task, standing for one
of the 18 propaganda techniques or “no technique.”
A complementary output focuses on the SLC task,
which is used to generate, through a trainable gate,
a weight w that is multiplied by the input of the
FLC task. The gate consists of a projection layer
to one dimension and an activation function. The
effect of this modeling is that if the sentence-level
classifier is confident that the sentence does not
contain propaganda, i.e., w ∼ 0, then no propa-
ganda technique would be predicted for any of the
word tokens in the sentence.
The model we use in Prta outperforms BERT-
based baselines on both at the sentence-level (F1
of 60.71 vs. 57.74) and at the fragment-level (F1
of 22.58 vs. 21.39). At the fragment-level, the
model outperforms the best solution of a hackathon
organized on this data.3
3https://www.datasciencesociety.net/events/
hack-the-news-datathon-2019
For the Prta system, we applied a softmax oper-
ator to turn its output into a bounded value in the
range [0,1], which allows us to show a confidence
for each prediction. Further details about the tech-
niques, the model, the data, and the experiments
can be found in (Da San Martino et al., 2019).4
3 System Architecture
Prta collects news articles from a number of news
outlets, discards near-duplicates and finally identi-
fies both specific propaganda techniques and sen-
tences containing propaganda.
We crawl a growing list (now 250) of RSS feeds,
Twitter accounts, and websites, and we extract the
plain text from the crawled Web pages using the
Newspaper3k library5. We then perform deduplica-
tion based on a combination of URL partial match-
ing and content analysis using a hash function.
Finally, we use the model from Section 2 to iden-
tify sentences with propaganda and instances of
use of specific propaganda techniques in the text
and their types. We further organize the articles
into topics; currently, the topics are defined us-
ing keyword matching, e.g., an article mentioning
COVID-19 or Brexit is assigned to a corresponding
topic. By accumulating the techniques identified
in multiple articles, Prta can show the volume
of propaganda techniques used by each medium
—as well as aggregated over all media for a specific
topic— thus, allowing the user to do comparisons
and analysis, as described in the next section.
4 Interface
Prta offers the following functionality.
For each crawled news article:
1. It flags all text spans in which a propaganda
technique has been spotted.
2. It flags all sentences containing propaganda.
For a user-provided text or a URL:
3. It flags the same as in 1 and 2 above.
At the medium and at the topic level:
4. It displays aggregated statistics about the pro-
paganda techniques used by all media on a
specific topic, and also for individual media,
or for media with specific political ideology.
4The corpus and the models are available online at
https://propaganda.qcri.org/fine-grained-propaganda
5http://newspaper.readthedocs.io
Figure 2: Overall view for a topic.
This functionality is implemented in the three
interfaces we expose to the user: the main topic
page, the article page, and the custom article page,
which we describe in Sections 4.1–4.3. Although
points 1 and 2 above are run offline, they can also
be invoked for a custom text using our API.6
4.1 Main Topic Page
Figure 2 shows a snapshot of the main page for
a given topic: here, the Coronavirus Outbreak in
2019-20. We can see on the left panel, a list of
the media covering the topic, sorted by number
of articles. This allows the user to get a general
idea about the degree of coverage of the topic by
different media.
The right panel in Figure 2 shows statistics about
the articles from the left panel. In particular, we
can see the global distribution of the propaganda
techniques in the articles, both in relative and in
absolute terms. The right panel further shows a
graph with the number of articles about the topic
and the average number of propaganda techniques
per article over time. Finally, it shows another
graph with the relative proportion of propagandistic
content per article; it is possible to click and to
navigate from this graph to the target article. The
latter two graphs are not shown in Figure 2, as they
could not fit in this paper, but the reader is welcome
to check them online.
6Link to the API available at https://www.tanbih.org/prta
The set of articles on the left panel can be filtered
by time interval, by keyword, by political orienta-
tion of the media (left/center/right), as well as by
any combination thereof.
Clicking on a medium on the left panel expands
it, displaying its articles ranked on the basis of
Eq. (1). Given the output of the multi-granularity
network, we compute a simple score to assess the
proportion of propaganda techniques in an article or
in an individual media source. Let F (x) be a set of
fragment-level annotations in article x, where each
annotation is a sequence of tokens. We compute
the propaganda score for x as the ratio between the
number of tokens covered by some propagandist
fragment (regardless of the technique) and the total
number of tokens in the article:
Qa(x) =
|⋃f∈F (x) f |
|x| . (1)
Selecting a medium, or any other filtering crite-
rion, further updates the graph on the center-right
panel. For example, Figures 3a and 3b show the
distribution of the techniques used by the BBC vs.
Fox News when covering the topic of Gun Control
and Gun Rights. We can see that both media use
a lot of loaded language, which is the most
common technique media use in general. However,
the BBC also makes heavy use of labeling and
doubt, whereas Fox News has a higher preference
for flag waving and slogans.
(a) BBC on Gun Control and Gun Rights
(b) Fox News on Gun Control and Gun Rights
(c) Fox News on Jamal Khashoggi’s Murder
Figure 3: Example of the distribution of the techniques
as used by two media and on two different topics. Note
that the scales are different.
Next, Figure 3c shows the propaganda tech-
niques used by Fox News when covering the
Khashoggi’s Murder, which has a very similar tech-
nique distribution to the plot in Figure 3b.
This similarity between the distribution of propa-
ganda techniques in Figures 3b and 3c might be a
coincidence, or it could represent a consistent style,
regardless of the topic. We leave the exploration
of this and other hypotheses to the interested user,
which is an easy exercise with the Prta system.
4.2 Article Page
When the user selects an article title on the left
panel (Figure 2), its full content will appear on a
middle panel with the propaganda fragments high-
lighted, as shown in Figure 4. Meanwhile, a right
panel will appear, showing the color codes used
for each of the techniques found in the article (the
techniques that are not present are shown in gray).
Moreover, using the slider bar on top of the right
panel, the user can set a confidence threshold, and
then only those propaganda fragments in the article
whose confidence is equal or higher than this set
threshold would be highlighted. When the user
hovers the mouse over a propagandist span, a short
description of the technique would pop up. If the
user wishes to find more information about the
propaganda techniques, she can simply click on the
corresponding question mark in the right panel.
4.3 Custom Article Analysis
Our interface allows the user to submit her own text
for analysis. This allows her to find the techniques
used in articles published by media that we do not
currently cover or to analyze other kinds of texts.
Texts can be submitted by copy-pasting in the text
box on top, or, alternatively, by using a URL. In
the latter case, the text box will be automatically
filled with the content extracted from the URL us-
ing the Newspaper3k library (see Section 3), but
the user can still edit the content before submitting
the text for analysis. The maximum allowed length
is the one enforced by the browser. Yet, we recom-
mend to keep texts shorter than 4k in order to avoid
blocking the server with too large requests.
Figure 5 shows the analysis for an excerpt of
Winston Churchill’s speech on May 10, 1940. All
the techniques found in this speech are highlighted
in the same way as described in Section 4.2. Notice
that, in this case, we have set the confidence thresh-
old to 0.4 and some of the techniques are conse-
quently not highlighted. We can see that the system
has identified heavy use of propaganda techniques.
In particular, we can observe the use of Flag Wav-
ing and Appeal to Fear, which is understandable
as the purpose of this speech was to prepare the
British population for war.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented the Prta system for detecting
and highlighting the use of propaganda techniques
in online news. The system further shows aggre-
gated statistics about the use of such techniques in
articles filtered according to several criteria, includ-
ing date ranges, media sources, bias of the sources,
and keyword searches. The system also allows
users to analyze their own text or the contents of a
URL of interest.
We have made publicly available our data and
models, as well as an API to the live system.
Figure 4: Selecting an article from the left panel, loads it and highlights its propaganda techniques.
Figure 5: Analysis of a custom text, an excerpt from a speech by W. Churchill at the beginning of World War II.
The confidence threshold is set to 0.4, and thus fragments for which the confidence is lower are not highlighted.
We hope that the Prta system would help raise
awareness about the use of propaganda techniques
in the news, thus promoting media literacy and
critical thinking, which are arguably the best long-
term answer to “fake news” and disinformation.
In future work, we plan to add more media
sources, especially from non-English media and
regions. We further want to extend the tool to sup-
port other propaganda techniques such as cherry-
picking and omission, among others, which would
require analysis beyond the text of a single article.
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